What makes a revolution? by MacCulloch, Robert
  
What Makes a Revolution? 
by 
 
Robert MacCulloch 
STICERD 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Suntory Centre 
Suntory and Toyota International Centres for  
Economics and Related Disciplines 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
Houghton Street 
London WC2A 2AE 
DEDPS 30     Tel:  (020) 7955 6674 
September 2001 
 
 
I thank Guiseppe Bertola, Partha Dasgupta, Rafael Di Tella, Herschel Grossman, Jurgen von Hagen and 
Jim Mirrlees for comments and advice, as well as seminar participants at the University of Bonn, The 
European University Institute in Florence and Cambridge University. 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Although property rights are the cornerstone of capitalist economies, 
throughout history existing claims have been frequently overturned and 
redefined by revolution. A fundamental question for economists is what 
makes revolutions more likely to occur. A large literature has found 
contradictory evidence for the effect of income and income inequality on 
revolt, possibly due to omitted variable bias. The primary innovation of the 
paper is to tackle this problem by introducing a new panel data set derived 
from surveys of revolutionary support across one-quarter of a million 
randomly sampled individuals. This allows one to control for unobserved 
fixed effects. The regressions are based on a choice-theoretic model of 
revolt. After controlling for personal characteristics, country and year fixed 
effects, more people are found to favor revolt when inequality is high and 
their net incomes are low. A policy that decreases inequality equivalent to a 
shift from the US to Luxembourg is predicted to decrease support for revolt 
by 7.7 percentage points. A decrease in net income of $US 3,510 (in 1985 
constant dollars) increases revolutionary support by the same amount. The 
results indicate that ‘going for growth’, or implementing policies that reduce 
inequality, can buy nations out of revolt. 
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I.  Introduction 
 
A fundamental requirement of market economies is the security of ownership claims 
to property.1 Without secure property rights, agents’ ability to enter and fulfill 
contractual obligations is threatened. Yet throughout history existing claims to 
property have been regularly challenged by revolts. From the 1917 Russian October 
Revolution to Castro’s 1959 Cuban revolt, from Portugal’s 1974 Revolution of the 
Carnations to the 1989 protests in East Germany that preceded the fall of the Berlin 
Wall, history is filled with examples of revolutions that have had far reaching 
economic consequences. Attempts at revolt have often met with failure. 
Consequently an important question in economics is what makes a revolt occur. As 
a first approach, there are two views. One is that ideological motives connected with 
notions of fairness, social justice and feelings of exploitation have motivated 
legendary figures such as Che Guevara to fight against impossible odds. The other 
view is that rational economic incentives are important. This suggests that we may 
be able to observe empirical regularities between macroeconomic variables and 
revolutionary support. Historical case studies have described the economic 
conditions perceived to be important. For the French Revolution, Hobsbawm 
(1975) writes that in pre-1789 France “feudal dues, tithes and taxes took a large and 
rising proportion of the peasant’s income, and inflation reduced the value of the 
remainder”.2 The welfare state is also credited with affecting revolutionary support. 
An example is the first mandatory, old-age pension system created in Germany in 
1889. Otto von Bismark, “its sponsor and thus the founder of modern old-age social 
security, was neither a reformer nor particularly liberal. The ‘iron-chancellor’ 
                                                 
1 On the use of force in economic history, see Douglass North (1981). 
2 The kingdom’s need for revenues was expanding, largely due to France’s involvement in the American War of 
Independence. In 1788 war and navy made up one-quarter of expenditure, outrunning tax revenues by over 20 per 
cent, far greater than “the extravagance of Versailles which has often been blamed for the crisis”. In fact, King Louis XVI’s court 
expenditure “only amounted to 6 per of total spending”. 
advocated social security in the hope of pacifying the proletariat and luring them 
away from socialism” (pp40-41, Carter and Shipman (1997)).3 The publication in 
1887 of Karl Marx’s (1887) Das Kapital began economists’ interest in the question of 
whether capitalist societies could be sustained, or would meet their end in violent 
confrontation.4 
 
Choice-theoretic models on conflict have made a number of appearances in the 
economics literature with a recent resurgence including Usher and Engineer (1987), 
Grossman (1991, 1994, 1999), Hirshleifer (1991, 1995), Kuran (1991), Roemer 
(1985, 1998), Skaperdas (1991, 1992), Grossman and Kim (1995) and Acemoglu and 
Robinson (1999, 2000). Several of these papers portray two-player contests between 
parties who are attempting to win control of a prize. Hirshleifer (1991) studies how 
the technologies of production and conflict affect the allocation of resources 
between production and conflict. Skaperdas (1991) studies the effect of risk-aversion 
on the allocation of resources between production and appropriation. Skaperdas 
(1992) and Hirshleifer (1995) derive conditions under which neither party invests in 
appropriative activities, despite there being a complete absence of property rights. 
Skaperdas’ (1992) model has an element of productive complementarity, an 
assumption not made by Hirshleifer (1995). In Grossman and Kim (1995) the 
allocation of resources between production and appropriation is modeled in a 
setting in which each party possesses non-overlapping claims to the property subject 
to appropriation. Hence a distinction exists between resources devoted to 
production and defense which does not exist in other papers in this literature. 
                                                 
3 Sala-i-Martin (1997) shows how social safety nets could be used “to bribe poor people out of disruptive activities such as crime, 
revolutions, and other forms of social disruption”. Revolutionary threats may also arise as a response to a corrupt bureaucracy 
that derives its income from malfeasant behavior (see Di Tella and Ades (2000)). 
4 Other classic contributions on the use of force in economics include Schumpeter (1991), Haavelmo (1954) and 
Tullock (1974). Schelling (1960) deals with conflicts between nations and Olson (1965) with the economics of 
collective action and special interest groups. The economics of crime literature began with Becker (1968) and Stigler 
(1970). 
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Another strand of literature studies collective action models. Kuran (1991) and 
Lohmann (1994) show how protest activity can trigger a cascade of more protests 
that lead to the incumbent regime’s collapse. 
 
However empirical contributions by economists have been particularly rare. 
Durham, Hirshleifer and Smith (1998) use experimental evidence to study under 
what conditions an initially poor party is able to improve its financial position 
relative to a richer opponent in a game where resources can be allocated between 
productive and appropriative efforts. The effect of inequality on political stability 
has been of particular interest since uncertainty about the political environment may 
affect investment and consequently economic growth (for a survey, see Benabou 
(1996)). Alesina and Perotti (1996) focus on estimating the significance of this 
channel to help resolve the important question of exactly how inequality could harm 
growth (see also Alesina, Özler, Roubini and Swagel (1996), Perotti (1996)). To my 
knowledge, no panel studies of the causes of revolution based on a choice-theoretic 
economic model exist. This may have occurred because panel data sets on which 
strong statistical tests could be made to identify the factors systematically linked to 
revolutionary behavior have not been available to economists. Another reason may 
be that it has been difficult to find models assuming rational agents that could be 
applied to an econometric study. 
 
The objective of this paper is to develop a choice-theoretic model of revolt that can 
be tested empirically to help identify the effect of income and income inequality on 
revolutionary support. It introduces a new panel data set based on large-scale 
surveys of revolutionary support across one-quarter of a million people. We seek to 
control for the possibility that both income and income inequality may be 
endogenous variables correlated with other omitted explanatory variables. General 
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equilibrium economic theory and historical evidence point to this possibility. For 
example, in Grossman’s (1991) model of insurrection a ruling authority that 
maximizes expected returns for its clientele will be acting, in part, to reduce the 
chances of a revolt occurring. This includes not allowing the difference in income 
between the State’s clientele and its subjects to grow too large. Hence one may 
expect the revolutionary activities of workers in response to their State’s policies to 
seldom culminate in a successful revolt due to their scale, which is constantly being 
limited by the State. A long tradition of study in English history (referred to as the 
“Whig” view) has provided evidence of evolutionary policies that have been 
specifically designed to avoid revolutionary attempts.5 Such policies imply that a 
negative bias may exist on the coefficient of income inequality in regressions 
attempting to explain the support for revolt (since the State moves to reduce income 
differences when threatened with more revolutionary pressures). This may help 
explain the ambiguous results of previous studies in the political science and 
sociology literature, which have found no clear evidence of a positive effect of 
inequality on revolt. The primary innovation of the present paper is to tackle this 
problem. It introduces a new panel data set derived from surveys of public opinion 
that allows us to control for unobserved fixed effects across nations and time. A 
choice-theoretic model of revolts is used as the basis for the empirical tests. The 
model helps us to choose which variables to include in the regression equation 
explaining revolt as well as an instrument set. This approach should help us to better 
identify the true effect of both income and income inequality on revolutionary 
support. 
                                                 
5 In early seventeenth century England, fiscal needs led to “expropriation of wealth through redefinition of rights in the 
sovereign’s favor” and subsequently civil war. After the Glorious Revolution of 1688, the winners (the Whigs) sought to 
redesign government institutions in such a way as to control the problem of “the exercise of arbitrary and confiscatory power 
by the Crown” (North and Weingast (1989)). Grossman (1994) shows how land reform that reduces inequality in the 
distribution of land ownership can be an optimal response to the threat of extralegal appropriation of the landed class’ 
income. Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) argue that political elites extended voting rights to prevent widespread social 
unrest and revolution. 
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 A large literature in political science and sociology has attempted to provide 
evidence on the economic conditions responsible for revolts. The reason for 
including economic variables in regression equations explaining revolt has been 
“economic discontent” theories. These include relative deprivation theory and 
Marxist theories of revolt. The former is based on the perceived gap between 
people’s expectations of what they should get from society and what they think they 
will actually get. The latter is based on the exploitation of workers by capitalists who 
expropriate “surplus value”, leading to the “immiseration” of the working class. 
Although these theories predict a positive effect of income inequality on political 
conflict, the empirical studies have yielded contradictory results (see, inter alia, Davies 
(1962), Gurr (1970), Muller (1985) and Lichbach (1989) for a review). Another 
strand of literature seeks to explain revolts by the political processes that provide 
opportunities for mobilized dissidents to challenge the State (see Tarrow (1989), 
Francisco (1993)). Empirical attempts have often used protests and political violence 
as proxies for revolutionary support. Gurr and Moore (1997) study the effect of 
deprivation and resource mobilization on ethno-political violence in the 1980s. A 
virtue of this paper is its first use of a global data set, but it uses cross-sectional 
evidence so cannot control for unobserved fixed effects. 
 
The present paper uses data from the Euro-Barometer Survey Series and the 
Combined World Values Survey in which over one-quarter of a million people are 
asked whether or not they support a revolt. This gives us direct evidence on the 
extent of revolutionary support across a panel of 12 nations from the 1970’s to the 
1990’s. Section II develops the theory used as a basis for empirically identifying the 
macro-economic variables that affect revolutionary support. Section III introduces 
the data set used in the paper as well as studying the effect of the personal 
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characteristics of individuals on the desire to revolt. Section IV outlines the 
estimation strategy. Section V presents the panel regression results and Section VI 
concludes. 
 
II.  Theory 
 
Grossman (1991) analyzes the behavior of many individual subjects of one ruling 
authority (or ‘State’) in response to its policies. This model forms the basis for the 
empirical tests in the present paper. By directly linking the desire to revolt across a 
population to macroeconomic variables, it opens a way for empirically testing the 
predictions of a rational economic theory of insurrection. By virtue of the State’s 
sovereign powers her policy variables – the level of taxes and soldiering – are set to 
maximize expected revenue for her clientele. The State employs soldiers to lessen 
the probability of a successful revolt. A large number of identical families respond to 
these policy choices by allocating a fraction of time, l, to become a member of the 
productive labor force, s to be soldiers and i to be engaged in revolutionary 
activities.6 These fractions must sum to unity. Let the average time spent across all 
families on labor force participation, soldiering and revolt be L, S and I, respectively. 
 
Each family’s total output is Q=λl and their net income from labor force 
participation is (1-x)λl, where x is the fraction of net taxes that the State deducts 
from earnings. The parameter, λ, measures gross earnings per unit of time (which 
equals labor productivity). Families’ income from soldiering is either ws with 
probability 1-β, or zero with probability β, where w is the wage rate of the soldiers 
                                                 
6 The theory assumes that the same families spend part of their day plotting revolt and then part of the day being paid 
as soldiers to stamp it out. This simplifying assumption does not capture those cases in which the security forces and 
revolutionaries are entirely different groups of people. 
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and β is the chance of a successful revolt. This setup assumes that soldiers are able 
to draw their pay only if there is not a successful insurrection. Income from 
participation in an insurrection is either ri/I with probability β or zero with 
probability 1-β. This assumes that insurgents divide their booty among families 
proportionately to the time spent by each family on insurrection. The booty, r, 
equals xλL+rs ≥ 0 which consists of the State’s net tax revenues, plus her stored 
capital, rs, which may have accumulated from sources other than current production. 
Without revolt the booty is enjoyed by the State’s clientele which includes politically 
favored groups.7 
 
II. A.  The Family Problem 
Families allocate their time to different activities to maximize their expected income: 
 
          1     such that
                        /  )1(  )1(         maximize ,,
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+−+−=
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(3)                                                                                                                                                                /)
(2)                                                                                                                                                           )1()
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These conditions imply that the return from time spent being a member of the labor 
force, (1-x)λ, must be equated to the expected returns from soldiering, (1-β)w, and 
from insurrection, βr/I. The probability of a successful revolt is given by: 
 
                                                 
7 Grossman (1999) extends this theory to a dynamic setting in which a successful revolt leads to the replacement of 
the old ruling class with a new revolutionary leader who then acts in the same way as the old regime, maximizing the 
expected net income of his or her own clientele. 
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which is increasing in I, the fraction of time devoted to revolt, and decreasing in S, 
the fraction of time spent soldiering. The parameters, θ and σ, capture the 
technology of insurrection. For any level of soldiering, S, that the State wishes to set, 
equation (2) defines the wage that must be offered to attract the soldiers. Combining 
equations (3) and (4), together with the constraint that total time spent on 
production, soldiering and insurrection must sum to unity (L+S+I=1), yields: 
 
0          
Y
    E )1(      ),(                     =−−−−
srISISf       (5) 
 
where E=x/(1-x), Y=(1-x)λ and f(S,I)=I+IθSσ. The variable, E, is a measure of 
income inequality in this economy. It is the tax revenue income of the State’s 
clientele relative to the net income from production (after taxes) of the workers.8 Y 
is workers’ net income from production. 
 
Theorem 1: The proportion of time spent on revolt, I, ceteris paribus: 
(1) decreases with Net Income: ∂I/∂Y<0, for rs>0. When rs=0, ∂I/∂Y=0. 
(2) increases with Income Inequality: ∂I/∂E>0. 
(3) decreases with Soldiering: ∂I/∂S<0. 
(4) increases with Stored Capital: ∂I/∂rs>0. 
 
Proof: Use the Implicit Function Rule on equation (5).   # 
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The intuition for these results is as follows. Net Income, Y, can increase (ceteris 
paribus) due to a rise in productivity, λ. When this occurs revolutionary support 
decreases, provided the level of stored capital is positive, since otherwise the return 
from labor force participation and revolt increase by the same proportion. With 
positive stored capital, the rise in productivity increases the return from participating 
in the labor force proportionately more than it increases the return from revolt. An 
increase in inequality increases the return from participating in revolt relative to 
production. Greater soldiering, S, reduces the expected return to revolt by reducing 
the chances of its success as well as the size of the booty (due to larger State military 
spending) making time spent in the labor force more attractive. More stored capital, 
rs, increase the booty available if the insurrection is successful and hence increase the 
returns to spending time on revolt. 
 
II. B.   The State’s Problem 
By virtue of her sovereign powers the State sets the policy variables - taxes and 
soldiering - to maximize a combination of the expected income of her clientele and 
of the production workers. Her problem is to: 
 
                               )-(1   ))(1(              maximize ,, ewSLxM ppSwx Ψ+−−Ψ= λβ   (6) 
 
subject to the constraints (2) and (3), L+S+I=1 and 0<Ψ p<1. The clientele’s 
expected income, (1-β)(xλL-wS), equals the net revenues taken from workers minus 
the payments to soldiers, multiplied by the probability of there not being a 
successful revolt. Workers’ welfare equals their expected income, e. The parameter, 
Ψ p, captures the preference over the distribution of income in the economy by the 
                                                                                                                                                          
8 Inequality could also be defined on an ex-ante basis, equal to the expected income of the State’s clientele relative to 
the expected income of the workers. Our ex-post definition is conditional on the revolutionaries not succeeding. 
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State.9 Constraints (2) and (3) define L and I in terms of x, w and S. The (interior) 
solution occurs when: 
 
1   and              =++
∂
∂
=
∂
∂
=
∂
∂ SIL
S
M
w
M
x
M        (7) 
 
The reduced form solution for net taxes on workers is x = f(r s, σ, θ, λ, Ψ p). Hence 
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Similarly the optimal level of soldiering can also be expressed in terms of the ‘deep’ 
parameters: S= g(r s, σ, θ, λ, Ψ p). In the next section, the data used for testing the 
predictions obtained in Theorem 1 are described. 
 
III.  The Data and Effect of Personal Characteristics on the Desire for Revolt 
 
III. A.   The Data 
Data on revolutions come from the Euro-Barometer Survey Series [1976-1990] and 
Combined World Values Survey [1980 and 1990] questions which ask: “On this card 
are three basic kinds of attitudes vis-a-vis the society in which we live in. Please choose the one which 
best describes your own opinion (One Answer Only)”. The three relevant response 
categories are: “The entire way our society is organised must be radically changed by revolutionary 
action”, “Our society must be gradually improved by reforms”, and “Our present society must be 
valiantly defended against all subversive forces” (The “Don't know” and “Not asked in this 
                                                 
9 Grossman (1991) solves for the case in which the State seeks solely to maximise the expected income of its clientele 
(Ψp=1). 
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survey” categories are not included in our data set). Appendix I provides a summary 
of these surveys. 
 
There are advantages and disadvantages to the use of survey data. An advantage is 
that individual responses give a direct measure of the support for revolt that actually 
exists in nations. An indirect measure, such as political violence or protest activity, 
may not capture the true underlying level of revolutionary support. Furthermore, 
since there are many different indirect measures that could potentially be used (such 
as the number of acts of sabotage, rallies and terrorism) it is difficult to choose 
between them. Events such as political strikes are hard to classify.10 One 
disadvantage of survey data is that the responses may be untruthful.11 However 
micro-econometric revolution equations were found to have a similar structure 
across nations. In every one of the 12 OECD nations in the Euro-Barometer 
Survey, being in a lower income quartile monotonically increases the chance of 
supporting revolt. Men are also more likely to desire revolt in every nation. 
Appendix II reports the results for the United Kingdom, Italy, Germany and 
Belgium which are discussed in more detail in Section III. B. below. These results 
would not be expected if the survey responses were random. A second disadvantage 
may be that although people say they support revolutionary change, they do not 
actually spend time to achieve it. The proxy works to the extent that the proportion 
of individuals in a country who state they desire revolt is positively correlated with 
the time being devoted to the cause. 
 
                                                 
10 Francisco (1993) uses person-days of protest per 100,000 persons per week, noting that “most empirical studies of 
protest and revolution use other measures, especially political deaths”. 
11 An issue raised in the psychology literature is that, in formulating their survey responses, subjects may be influenced 
by what they believe to be the socially desirable response. If the social norm is not to support revolt, subjects may 
bias responses towards maintaining the status quo. Since the first studies in the area, psychologists have found 
evidence that points to this concern being exaggerated (e.g. Rorer (1965), Bradburn (1969)). Furthermore, at least part 
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The survey response categories also force the individual respondents to make a 
discrete choice (you must either declare yourself in favour of revolt or not) whereas 
in our theory each family can devote a continuous fraction of their day on 
insurrection activities. This problem can be overcome by introducing an element of 
heterogeneity amongst families. The simplest way is to make the following 
assumption: each family, f, declares itself in favor of supporting revolt only if it 
spends at least time, i f, on revolutionary activities, where the cumulative distribution 
function of positive responses is G(i) (G(0)=0, G(1)=1 and G′(i)>0). With this 
assumption, as the population spends more time planning revolt, an increasing 
proportion will declare support for it.12 
 
Tables A, B and C show the proportions of Russians, Americans and Europeans 
who desire revolutionary action, versus those who do not (i.e. the ones who desire 
either gradual reforms or the present society valiantly defended) by employment 
state, marital status, sex and income quartile. Russia has the highest overall 
proportion of people who desire revolt. In 1990 in this nation, 17.2 per cent of 
individuals wanted a revolution which included 30.8 per cent of the unemployed. 
Table B shows the proportion of American respondents who desire revolutionary 
action, depending on personal characteristics, pooled across 1980 and 1990. The 
proportion increased from 5.0 per cent in 1980 to 6.5 per cent in 1990. The support 
level rose from 4.1 per cent for the highest third of income earners to 7.2 per cent 
for the lowest third. 
 
                                                                                                                                                          
of the influence of social norms can be controlled for in the regression evidence later on. The interviews for the 
Euro-Barometer Surveys were conducted under a condition of anonymity of the respondent. 
12 A more complicated way of introducing heterogeneity that would affect the incentives of families in the model is to 
assume a distribution of wages across the population. In equilibrium the returns to soldiering, revolt and production 
could then not be equalized across all families. Corner solutions in which some families devote all their time to 
production whilst others spent all their time plotting revolt must exist. The survey responses of those involved solely 
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There were 215,707 European survey respondents, covering people living in 12 
nations between 1976 and 1990. Of the whole sample, 5.9 per cent desire revolution 
(see Table C). Of the sub-sample of unemployed people, 9.7 per cent desire revolt, 
which is lower than amongst the unemployed in the United States. A higher 
proportion of divorced respondents (6.8 per cent) were in favor of revolt compared 
to married ones (5.2 per cent). Of male respondents, 6.8 per cent desire revolt 
compared with 5.1 per cent of females. As we proceed from the lowest to the 
highest income quartiles, there is a monotonically decreasing proportion of 
responses in favour of revolution, the biggest jump occurring between the 2nd and 
3rd income quartiles (from 6.5 per cent to 5.6 per cent, respectively). Appendix III 
shows how the proportion of respondents who desire revolt has varied over time for 
each country. Note the particularly high level of revolutionary support in Portugal, 
which fell from 14.3 per cent in 1985 to 6.0 per cent in 1986. After the “Revolution 
of the Carnations” on 25 April 1974, Portugal experienced extreme political swings 
and strikes until entry into the European Community in 1986 secured a measure of 
stability.13 The lowest average level of revolutionary support was in Denmark where 
just 2.3 per cent were in favour.14 
 
III. B.   The Effect of Personal Characteristics on the Desire for Revolution 
The micro-econometric results showing the effect of personal characteristics on 
whether or not the respondent supports revolt are reported in Table D for the 
                                                                                                                                                          
in production would presumably not favor revolt, whereas those families whose sole activity was insurrection would 
presumably give responses supporting it. 
13 The subsequent regression results are unaffected by the omission of Portugal. 
14 Although this number seems low, Kuran (1991) shows how ‘revolutionary bandwagons’ can lead to small events 
creating very large increases in public opposition to the State. For example, if one individual has an unpleasant 
experience with the State that increases his alienation from it and drives him to revolt this may trigger another 
defection from a person who sees that there is now more opposition and fewer hostile State supporters to be faced. 
This process may continue, generating explosive growth in opposition from an initially small base, until even people 
who had previously strongly supported the State join the revolt as they fear hostility from the revolutionaries if they 
don’t. Lohmann (1994) uses evidence from the East German revolution to evaluate several models of mass political 
action. 
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whole Euro-Barometer sample. Appendix II provides separate regressions for 4 of 
the 12 nations: The United Kingdom, Italy, Germany and Belgium.15 There are 
strong similarities between nations of the effect of several personal characteristics on 
whether a respondent declares him/herself in favour of revolt. In every nation being 
in a higher income quartile monotonically decreases the chance of supporting revolt. 
A shift from the bottom to the top income quartile in the U.K. decreases the 
probability of supporting revolt by, on average, 4.3 percentage points (from 7.5% to 
3.2%). Men are more likely to desire revolt in every nation, significant at least at the 
2 per cent level in 9 countries and at the 10 per cent level in the remaining three. 
 
In 10 of the 12 nations studied, being unemployed increases the chances of 
supporting revolt. The effect is significant at least at the 5 per cent level in seven of 
these countries. In every country married people are less likely to support revolt. 
The effect of other personal characteristics is more ambiguous. Older people are less 
likely in every nation, except Portugal, to declare themselves in favour of 
revolutionary action, although the effect is only significant in 3 nations. Whereas a 
British higher education decreases support for revolt, a French higher education 
increases it, both significant at the 1 per cent level. Overall, a higher education after 
leaving school decreases revolutionary support in six countries and increases it in the 
other six. In a majority of nations having children decreases support for revolt.16 
 
IV.  Empirical Strategy for Testing a Rational Choice Theory of Revolt 
 
The empirical strategy has two stages. In the first stage we obtain estimates of the 
                                                 
15 The results for the other countries are available upon request. 
16 The effect of personal characteristics on the desire for revolt across 51,793 individuals from the 37 nations in the 
World Values Survey show similar patterns. In particular, the size and sign of the coefficients on Unemployed and Male 
are similar to those obtained using the Euro-Barometer sample. Support for revolt also declines monotonically as one 
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proportion of respondents in each of nation and year who respond that “the entire 
way our society is organised must be radically changed by revolutionary action”, 
controlling for personal characteristics.17 In the second stage we estimate the impact 
of income, income inequality and the size of the military on this residual measure of 
revolutionary support.18 
 
First, we estimate the effect of personal characteristics on individual survey 
responses of revolutionary choices in OLS micro-econometric regressions for each 
nation. These regressions are of the following form: 
 
tntn
j
tn
j
tnDESIREDREVOLUTION ,,,10,                      ? µφαα ++Χ+=     (9) 
 
where  REVOLUTION DESIRED ? n,tj is a discrete variable taking the value 1 if 
individual j in nation n (n=1 to 12) and year t (t=1976 to 1990) responds that “The 
entire way our society is organised must be radically changed by revolutionary action” and 0 
otherwise.19 Xn,tj is the vector of personal characteristics for each individual and the 
vector, α1, contains the coefficients of the personal characteristics. The coefficients 
on the set of time dummies are denoted, φn,t, whereas µn,t are independently, 
identically distributed (i.i.d) errors. Appendix II reports four such regressions for the 
U.K., Italy, Germany and Belgium.20 Our main interest is the measure of aggregate 
support for revolt after controlling for personal characteristics, for each nation and 
year in the sample, given by the coefficients on the year dummies, φn,t. 
                                                                                                                                                          
goes up the income groups and there is some evidence that having more children decreases revolutionary support 
(results available upon request). 
17 On average, 1266 individuals are sampled each year for a given nation. 
18 Similar results are also obtained if we don’t control for the effect of personal characteristics and just use the 
proportion of people who desire revolution in each country for each year from the raw data. 
19 Data on revolutionary preferences are only available for 1980-90 for Greece and 1985-90 for Spain and Portugal. 
20 Regression (9) was estimated using OLS since using residuals from logit regressions introduces issues that have not 
been resolved in the statistical literature. A similar procedure was used in Di Tella, MacCulloch and Oswald (2000). 
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 The second stage regressions are based on equation (5) which defines aggregate 
revolutionary support, I, implicitly in terms of the explanatory variables Y, E, S, rs, σ 
and θ. Whereas it is possible to obtain data for proxies of net income, Y, the degree 
of income inequality, E, and soldiering, S, the other variables are more problematic. 
It is not possible to obtain direct measures for the amount of stored capital, rs, that 
belongs to the State’s clientele who are probably difficult to even identify. No data 
also exist for the revolutionary technology variables, σ and θ. We shall focus on the 
effect of net income, income inequality and soldiering on revolutionary support in a 
set of primary regression specifications. Subsequently several other variables that 
could help explain revolutionary support are included in a set of secondary 
regression specifications. 
 
IV. A.   Primary Regression Specification 
The primary ‘second-stage’ OLS regressions are of the form: 
 
tntntntntnotn MILITARYINEQUALITYINCOMEINCOMENET ,,3,2,1,         εδϕββββφ ++++++=  (10)         
 
where ϕn and δt represent country and year fixed effects, respectively, and εn,t is the 
error term  (i.i.d.). All variables are measured across a panel data set comprising 12 
nations over the 15 year period from 1976 to 1990.21 The two-stage procedure 
ensures that we have the same (correct) level of aggregation between left-hand and 
right-hand variables, so it avoids the bias specified in Moulton (1986). This can also 
                                                 
21 The total number of observations is reduced to 119 due to limited availability of inequality panel data. The full 
sample consists of 1976-90 for Denmark, Italy and the U.K., 1976-89 for The Netherlands, 1976-87 for Ireland, 1980-
88 for Greece, 1976-84 for France and Germany, 1979-87 for Belgium, 1985-89 for Spain, 1985-90 for Portugal and 
1985 for Luxembourg. 
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be achieved by estimation in one stage but correcting the standard errors.22 NET 
INCOME, which proxies for income after net transfers in the model, Y, is measured 
as average household current receipts per capita per year after deducting direct taxes, 
at the price levels and exchange rates of 1985 (in U.S. dollars). INCOME 
INEQUALITY proxies for the ratio of the income of the State’s clientele to its 
workers, E. It is measured by the Gini coefficient taken from the World Bank’s 
Deininger and Squire (1996) ‘high quality’ data set (which has recently been used in 
Forbes (2000) to investigate the effect of inequality on the growth rate).23 Soldiering, 
S, is proxied by MILITARY, which is total military expenditures as a fraction of 
GDP.24 
 
IV. B.   Biases Caused by Omitted Variables    
The parameters that characterize the technology of revolt, σ and θ, are unobservable 
and hence form part of the error term in regression (10). They capture the 
productivity of revolutionary time in increasing the chances of a successful revolt 
and the productivity of counter-revolutionary soldiering time in reducing its chances. 
Observations of σ and θ are unavailable since they would have to measure not only 
weapon and information technology, but possibly also the charisma of a leader who 
may be able to inspire a small band of revolutionaries to achieve a great success. As 
these parameters vary the State reacts (according to equation (8)) by adjusting its 
policy variable, x, so as to change net income, Y, and income inequality, E. 
Soldiering may also be adjusted. In the setting of another model, Durham, 
Hirshleifer and Smith (1998) show how the evolution of the income distribution 
                                                 
22 The two-stage procedure is preferred since it is more transparent (for instance, one can graph the aggregate 
proportion who support revolution). Besides, in the two-stage procedure, the number of observations is directly 
related to the degrees of freedom that we actually have. 
23 For some countries, there are several missing years of data in the time series. Where this occurs, linear interpolation 
was used to complete the panel. Details are contained in Appendix IV. 
24 This variable does not measure spending on the police who may also be used to quell insurrection. However 
comparable policing statistics do not exist across many of the nations and years in the panel. 
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may depend on the decisiveness of conflictual effort. This technological parameter 
determines the relative allocation of output between productive and appropriative 
activities. Hence an omitted variable bias may arise in our regressions due to the 
potential correlation of the error term with the included explanatory variables. 
 
This potential bias is dealt with in two ways. First, country and year fixed effects, ϕn 
and δt, have been included in the estimated regressions. As a result, it is possible to 
control for fixed differences in the parameters, σ and θ, across nations as well as 
shifts in σ and θ in a particular year for all nations. Country fixed effects not only 
take account of variations in the revolt technology possessed by security forces and 
rebels in different places, but also have the advantage of controlling for cultural and 
language differences that may affect how different nationalities respond to our 
survey question. Year fixed effects may be particularly useful to help control for 
sudden shifts in mass political support caused by ‘revolutionary bandwagons’ or 
informational cascades, studied in Kuran (1991) and Lohmann (1994). These two 
papers show how initially small events of no obvious significance (for example, the 
1989 Leipzig Monday demonstrations which preceded the collapse of the German 
Democratic Republic) are capable of leading to large shifts in public opinion in a 
short period of time. The 1989-90 period saw a rapid rise of dissent and collapse of 
regimes across Eastern Europe, possibly linked to Gorbachev’s reforms (discussed 
in Kuran (1991)). Including year dummies in our regressions should help capture 
those omitted variables that lead to such shifts in revolutionary desires that sweep 
nations at certain times. 
 
Second, instruments are chosen for NET INCOME, INCOME INEQUALITY and 
MILITARY that are correlated with these variables but are neither tax/benefit nor 
soldiering policy instruments of the State (and hence are uncorrelated with the 
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regression error term). The instruments used are OIL, OPENNESS and RIGHT 
WING, as well as changes in these variables. They are based on the equation (8) 
parameters, λ and Ψ p, that measure labor productivity and the preference over 
income distribution by the government. The two parameters, λ and Ψ p, affect Y, E 
and S but not the other variables in equation (5) which defines the support for 
revolt, I. The instrument, OIL, is an index of the country-specific real price of oil, 
calculated as the price of oil in the local currency divided by each nation’s GDP 
deflator and standardized to equal 1 across all nations in 1975. The advantage of this 
instrument is that although it may be correlated with workers’ real net incomes, as 
well as inequality, it is not dependent on the tax/benefit or soldiering policies of the 
nations in our sample that could be changed in response to revolutionary pressures. 
Second, OPENNESS is defined as the sum of imports and exports, divided by 
GDP. It may affect workers’ earnings and income inequality through several 
different channels. One way is through the wages and unemployment rates of 
unskilled workers (see, for example, Freeman (1995) and Wood (1994)) and another 
is through government welfare programs whose size may depend on the level of risk 
in the economy (Di Tella and MacCulloch (2000) and Rodrik (1998)). Third, RIGHT 
WING is a measure of the extent to which the political preferences in a country lean 
towards the right. It is similar to those measures used by political scientists to 
indicate the left/right position of a government, and is constructed in two steps (see, 
for example, Hicks and Swank (1992)). In the first step, we collect the number of 
votes received by each party participating in cabinet and express them as a 
percentage of the total votes received by all parties with cabinet representation. In 
the second step, this percentage of support is multiplied by a left/right political scale 
(from Castles and Mair (1984)) and summed across all parties to give a continuous 
variable.25 
                                                 
25 This instrument is unlikely to have been influenced by the voting patterns of the individuals in our sample who 
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 To serve as valid instruments, these variables must be uncorrelated with 
revolutionary support, except through variables included in the equation explaining 
revolts (see Levitt (1997) for an example when estimating the effect of police on 
crime using electoral cycles). Other possible variables that may help explain revolts 
and could also be correlated with the instruments include the unemployment rate 
and the inflation rate. In a series of secondary regression specifications, controls for 
these variables are included to provide checks on the results. 
 
IV. C.   Secondary Regression Specification 
The secondary regression specifications are of the form: 
 
tntntntn
tntntntnotn
NTUNEMPLOYMERATEINFLATION
MILITARYINEQUALITYINCOMEINCOMENET
,,6,5
,4,3,21,1,
                                             
    
νσθωω
ωωωφωωφ
+++++
++++=
−   (11) 
 
where θn and σt are country and year fixed effects, respectively, and νn,t is the error 
term (i.i.d.). INFLATION RATE is the rate of change in the GDP deflator and 
UNEMPLOYMENT is the unemployment rate. HAPPINESS is the average level 
of self-reported well-being (after controlling for personal characteristics) taken from 
the Euro-Barometer Survey Series. 
 
Figures 1 to 4 show some evidence that in the pooled (across countries and time) 
raw macro data, nations with high net incomes, low inequality and low inflation rates 
tend to have experienced less support for revolts. 
 
                                                                                                                                                          
wanted “the entire way our society is organised” to be “radically changed by revolutionary action”. Of the 5.9% of individuals in 
the full sample who desire revolt, 31% do not state an affiliation with any political party. This leaves 4.1% 
(=0.69*0.059) who support a recognized political party, consisting of 2.7% support for left-wing parties and 1.4% 
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V. The Effect of Net Income and Income Inequality on Revolutionary  
Support 
 
V. A.  Results using the Primary Regression Specification 
In Table I we estimate the effect of NET INCOME, INCOME INEQUALITY and 
MILITARY on the dependent variable, REVOLUTIONARY SUPPORT. 
Regression (1) is estimated using pooled OLS. The coefficients of the three 
explanatory variables have the signs predicted in Theorem 1 although the only 
significant coefficient is on MILITARY spending, at the 5 per cent level. These 
findings are similar to the cross-section results reported in the previous literature 
that has found, in particular, no clear evidence of a positive effect of inequality on 
revolt. However due to the potential omitted variable problems discussed in Section 
IV, we may expect the coefficients of these three explanatory variables to be biased 
against finding the signs predicted in Theorem 1. If better revolt technology or more 
charismatic revolutionary leaders yield greater support for revolt in a nation, the 
State can react by changing its tax/benefit policies to increase NET INCOME and 
reduce INCOME INEQUALITY. It can also spend more on the military. Hence 
once we control for unobserved fixed effects, we may expect to find coefficients on 
the explanatory variables that have larger absolute magnitudes and greater 
significance levels than those reported in regression (1). 
 
In regression (2), which controls for country fixed effects, revolutionary support is 
reduced by higher NET INCOME, increased by higher INEQUALITY and reduced 
by more MILITARY. The coefficient of NET INCOME is now significant at the 1 
per cent level. A one standard deviation increase in NET INCOME (equivalent to 
$US 2588 in 1985 dollars) reduces the support for revolt by 2.1 percentage points 
                                                                                                                                                          
support for the others. Many of these parties have never been represented in cabinet (such as Sinn Fein in Ireland). 
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(or 1.2 times one standard deviation in this variable). The coefficient of 
INEQUALITY is also now significant at the 1 per cent level. A one standard 
deviation increase in inequality, equal to a rise in the Gini coefficient of 0.04 (on a 
scale from 0 to 1) is predicted to add 1.5 percentage points onto the level of 
revolutionary support (or 0.8 times one standard deviation in this variable). Higher 
MILITARY reduces support for revolt at the 1 per cent level of significance. A one 
standard deviation increase in MILITARY, equal to a rise in military spending 
divided by GDP of 2.2 percentage points, reduces support for revolt by 1.3 
percentage points (or 0.7 times one standard deviation). As an example of the total 
potential size of all these effects, consider a shift from Luxembourg (which has the 
lowest inequality in the sample) to Portugal (which has the highest inequality). A rise 
in inequality from its level in Luxembourg to Portugal (from a Gini coefficient of 
0.27 to 0.37) is predicted to add 3.8 percentage points onto revolutionary support. A 
drop in NET INCOME from Luxembourg to Portugal (from $US 13801 to $US 
3846) should increase support for revolt by 8.0 percentage points. An increase in 
military spending from its level in Luxembourg to Portugal (from 1.6 percent of 
GDP to 6.4 per cent of GDP) is predicted to reduce revolutionary support by 2.7 
percentage points. The net effect of all these differences in net income, inequality 
and military is that the support for revolt is predicted to be 9.1 percentage points 
higher in Portugal compared to Luxembourg (=3.8+8.0-2.7). The actual difference 
was 5.0 percentage points (2.3 percentage points in Luxembourg compared to 7.3 
percentage points in Portugal). 
 
As a further control for the potential bias that may still exist, regression (3) re-
estimates the specification in regression (2) but using Two Stage Least Squares 
(2SLS). All three variables are regarded as endogenous and an instrument set 
consisting of OIL, OPENNESS and RIGHT WING (as well as changes in these 
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variables) is used. Since we again expect any remaining biases to have the opposite 
signs to the ones actually estimated on each of the coefficients in regression (2), 
instrumenting NET INCOME, INCOME INEQUALITY and MILITARY should 
help to identify even stronger effects (provided our instruments are correlated highly 
enough with the endogenous variables). In regression (3) the coefficient on NET 
INCOME becomes 1.8 times larger in absolute value than its corresponding value in 
regression (2) (-0.014 compared to -0.008) and is significant at the 1 per cent level. A 
one standard deviation increase in NET INCOME is now predicted to add 3.6 
percentage points onto revolutionary support (or 2.0 times one standard deviation in 
this variable). The coefficient on INCOME INEQUALITY in regression (3) is 
significant at the 1 per cent level and also becomes 1.8 times larger than its 
corresponding value in regression (2) (0.659 compared to 0.375). A one standard 
deviation increase in INEQUALITY should add 2.6 percentage points onto 
revolutionary support (or 1.4 times one standard deviation in this variable). The 
coefficient on MILITARY retains its significance level of 1 per cent and increases 
the size of its effect on the support for revolt by 1.1 times (-0.619 compared to -
0.572). A one standard deviation increase in this variable should now reduce 
revolutionary support by 1.4 percentage points (or 0.8 times one standard deviation).  
 
Regression (4) is estimated using 2SLS but now adds controls for year, as well as 
country, fixed effects. The coefficient on NET INCOME further increases in 
absolute size (by 1.6 times) compared to its regression (3) value. It now equals -
0.022, significant at the 1 per cent level. Using this specification, a one standard 
deviation increase in NET INCOME is predicted to increase revolutionary support 
by 5.7 percentage points (or 3.2 times one standard deviation). INCOME 
INEQUALITY has a positive effect on revolutionary support in regression (4) equal 
to 0.855, significant at the 1 per cent level and also increases in size (by 1.3 times) 
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compared to its regression (3) value. A one standard deviation increase in INCOME 
INEQUALITY is predicted to add 3.4 percentage points onto the support for revolt 
(or 1.9 times one standard deviation). MILITARY has a negative, but insignificant, 
coefficient. The marginal rates of substitution between NET INCOME and 
INEQUALITY (that keep revolutionary support constant) are of similar magnitude 
across the different specifications. It equals 47 for regression (2) (=0.375/0.008), 47 
for regression (3) (=0.659/0.014) and 39 for regression (4) (=0.855/0.022). These 
numbers tell us how much extra net income one must give workers to keep their 
support for revolt unchanged when there exists higher inequality in their nation. As 
an example, consider the differences that exist between Luxembourg and the United 
States. Higher inequality in the U.S. compared to Luxembourg (a Gini of 0.36 
compared to 0.27) increases the support for revolt by 7.7 percentage points, ceteris 
paribus (using the regression (4) specification). However an increase in NET 
INCOME equal to $US 3510 (=39*(0.36-0.27)*1000) should reduce revolutionary 
support by the same amount. In fact, average net income was $US 5526 higher in 
the U.S. compared to Luxembourg. Consequently the higher level of net income in 
the U.S. more than compensates for its greater inequality. In this sense, ‘going for 
growth’ could buy a nation out of a revolt. 
 
Because the number of instruments is greater than the number of endogenous 
regressors used in estimating regressions (3) and (4) the equation is over-identified 
which allows us to test for the exogeneity of the extra instruments. The method for 
testing these kinds of restrictions is as follows: the residuals from the second-stage 
regression of 2SLS must be regressed on the exogenous variables in the 
specification, as well as the set of instruments.26 The test statistic for the validity of 
the over-identifying restrictions is computed as N*R2, where N is the number of 
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observations and R2 is the unadjusted R2 from the regression of the residuals on the 
exogenous variables and the instruments. This test statistic is distributed χ2, with 
degrees of freedom equal to the number of over-identifying restrictions. The 
exogeneity of the over-identifying restrictions cannot be rejected for both regression 
(3) (p-value= 0.10) and regression (4) (p-value= 0.25). 
 
V. B.  Checks on the Results using Secondary Regression Specifications 
Regressions (5) to (8) in Table II control for the effect of several other variables that 
may help explain revolts. They all use Two Stage Least Squares estimation. NET 
INCOME, INCOME INEQUALITY and MILITARY are treated as endogenous 
variables and the other explanatory variables as exogenous. Exogeneity of the over-
identifying restrictions could not be rejected in any of these regression equations 
(the p-values are all greater than 0.10). Regression (5) adds a lagged dependent 
variable, which is not significant, to the regression (4) specification. The size of the 
coefficients of NET INCOME and INCOME INEQUALITY remain similar to 
their previous values. INCOME INEQUALITY is significant at the 5 percent level 
and NET INCOME at the 10 percent level. 
 
Since the validity of the instruments depends on them being uncorrelated with 
revolutionary support, except through variables included in the equation explaining 
revolutionary support, controls for inflation and unemployment are included in the 
next regressions as additional checks on the results reported in Table I. In regression 
(6) neither the INFLATION RATE nor UNEMPLOYMENT have significant 
effects on revolutionary support.27 NET INCOME and INCOME INEQUALITY 
                                                                                                                                                          
26 Since all the explanatory variables in Table I have been treated as endogenous, the residuals from the second-stage 
regression are regressed solely on the instrument set. 
27 The effect of personally being unemployed on one’s desire for revolt has already been controlled for in the first-
stage microeconometric regressions along with other personal characteristics. Hence the coefficient of the 
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both retain coefficients of similar magnitudes to their values in regression (4) (which 
also controls for country and year dummies). They also both retain their significance 
levels, NET INCOME at the 5 per cent level and INCOME INEQUALITY at the 1 
per cent level. The pooled relationship between inflation and revolutionary support, 
graphed in Figure 4, did reveal some evidence that a positive correlation may exist 
between these two variables. Regression (7) shows that this result is only robust to 
the inclusion of country dummies. Using the coefficient on INFLATION RATE in 
this specification, a one standard deviation increase in inflation (or 4.9 percentage 
points) is predicted to increase the support for revolt by 0.6 of a percentage point 
(or 0.35 times one standard deviation). The unemployment rate is not significant in 
regression (7), whereas NET INCOME and INCOME INEQUALITY both have 
significance levels of 1 per cent.28 
 
VI.  Conclusions 
 
Although the security of ownership claims to property is one of the most basic 
requirements of a market economy, surprisingly large numbers of people declare 
themselves in favor of completing changing the way society is organized by 
revolutionary action. Large differences exist across nations and over time. In the 
United Kingdom in 1981, 10.1 per cent of individuals desired revolution, whereas 
there was only 1.2 per cent support in Denmark in 1987. In the United States the 
support for revolt increased from 5.0 per cent in 1980 to 6.5 per cent in 1990 
whereas in Russia in 1990 it stood at 17.2 per cent. On average, 5.9 per cent of 
people desired revolt between 1976 and 1990 across the 12 OECD nations in the 
                                                                                                                                                          
unemployment rate in the second-stage macro-regressions measures the extent to which the average member of 
society changes his or her revolutionary support as unemployment grows. 
28 We also tried including the change in income as an explanatory variable. Its coefficient was not significant. Results 
available on request. 
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panel used in this paper. 
 
The causes of revolts have until recently received little interest from economists but 
much attention from historians and political scientists. The reasons may be that large 
scale data sets which could shed light on factors systematically linked to 
revolutionary behavior, as well as choice-theoretic models on which an empirical 
study could be based, have been absent in the past. This paper seeks to identify the 
effect of income and income inequality on revolutionary support. It introduces a 
new panel data set derived from large-scale surveys of public opinion which contain 
information on the revolutionary choices of approximately one-quarter of a million 
individuals. This allows one to control for unobserved fixed effects across nations 
and time which may have biased a large body of previous research that has struggled 
to find evidence of significant effects of income and income inequality on revolt. 
The paper also bases its regression equations on a choice-theoretic model of revolts 
that helps us to choose which variables to include in the equation explaining 
revolutionary support as well as in the instrument set. 
 
After controlling for personal characteristics, as well as country and year fixed 
effects, we find that: 
1. More people desire revolutionary action when their net incomes are low. The 
regressions estimate that a one standard deviation decrease in net income (or 
$US 2588 in 1985 dollars) leads to an increase in revolutionary support of up 
to 5.7 percentage points (or 3.2 times one standard deviation in the support 
for revolt). 
 
2. Revolutionary support is lower when income inequality is low. A one standard 
deviation decrease in inequality (or a shift in the Gini coefficient of 0.04 
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measured on a 0 to 1 scale) leads to a decrease in revolutionary support of up 
to 3.4 percentage points (or 1.9 times one standard deviation). Results (1) and 
(2) combined indicate that ‘going for growth’, or implementing policies that 
reduce inequality, can buy nations out of revolt. For example, although 
inequality is higher in the United States compared to Luxembourg, an 
increase in net income of $US 3510 should keep revolutionary support in the 
U.S. unchanged. Actual net income in the U.S. compared to Luxembourg 
exceeded this difference. 
 
3. Being unemployed significantly increases the likelihood of an individual 
responding in favor of revolutionary action in 7 of the 12 nations used in the 
panel regressions. However the unemployment rate is not a significant 
determinant of aggregate revolutionary support, after controlling for this 
personal effect. 
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Table A: Desire for Revolution in Russia in 1990. 
Revolution       Marital Status            
Desired? All Unemployed Married Divorced Single 
      
Yes 17.20 30.77  16.45  6.37 28.92 
      
No 82.80 69.23  83.55 93.63 71.08 
    Income Group  
Revolution    Sex       1st 2nd       3rd  
Desired? Male Female (Lowest)  (Highest) 
      
Yes 22.56 13.00   16.10 18.27  17.03 
      
No  77.44 87.00  83.90 81.73 82.97 
Note: Based on 1,703 observations of individuals. All numbers are expressed as 
percentages. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table B: Desire for Revolution in the United States: 1980 and 1990. 
Revolution       Marital Status            
Desired? All Unemployed Married Divorced Single 
      
Yes 5.65 12.62   5.04  9.31  6.47 
      
No 94.35 87.38 94.96 90.69 93.53 
    Income Group  
Revolution    Sex       1st  2nd       3rd 
Desired? Male Female (Lowest)  (Highest) 
      
Yes  5.45   5.82  7.18 5.91 4.08 
      
No 94.55 94.18 92.82 94.09 95.92 
Note: Based on 3,737 observations of individuals. All numbers are expressed as 
percentages. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table C: Desire for Revolution in Europe: 1976-90. 
Revolution       Marital Status            
Desired? All Unemployed Married Divorced Single 
      
Yes 5.93 9.67  5.20  6.75  8.12 
      
No 94.07 90.33 94.80 93.25 91.88 
    Income Quartiles  
Revolution    Sex      1st 2nd      3rd     4th  
Desired? Male Female (Lowest)   (Highest)
       
Yes 6.77  5.09   6.64 6.50  5.62  5.05 
       
No 93.23 94.91  93.36 93.50 94.38 94.95 
Note: Based on 215,707 observations of individuals. All numbers are expressed 
as percentages. 
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Table D 
The Microeconometric Determinants of the Desire for Revolution (Logit 
Regression) Pooled Across 12 Nations from 1976 to 1990. Number of 
observations=215,707. 
Dep Var: Revolution Desired?   Coefficient Standard Error 
Unemployed   0.248 0.037 
Self employed  -0.074 0.033 
Male   0.301  0.022 
Age  -0.015 0.004 
Age Squared    1.3e-6  4.4e-5 
Education to age:  15-18 years  -0.012 0.026 
          ≥ 19 years   0.059 0.030 
Marital Status:   Married  -0.185 0.028 
 Divorced   0.200 0.062 
  Separated   0.362 0.078 
  Widowed  -0.153 0.053 
No. of children ≥ 8 &  15 yrs:    1   -4.9e-4 0.026 
                                                  2  -0.040 0.034 
                                                 ≥3  -0.042 0.050 
Income Quartiles: Second  -0.188 0.027 
                   Third  -0.392 0.028 
                   Fourth (highest)  -0.546 0.030 
Retired  -0.205 0.044 
School  -0.019 0.040 
Home  -0.102 0.032 
Countries: Belgium  -0.129 0.036 
  Netherlands  -0.573 0.040 
  West Germany  -1.044 0.046 
  Italy  -0.077 0.034 
  Denmark  -1.239 0.050 
  Ireland  -0.161 0.040 
  Britain  -0.182 0.037 
  Greece   0.329 0.037 
  Spain  -0.117 0.057 
                     Luxembourg  -0.828 0.070 
  Portugal   0.099 0.053 
Notes: Log-likelihood=-45953. Chi2(45)=4251. The regression includes year 
dummies from 1976 to 1990. The base country dummy is France. 
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Figure 1: The Proportion of Individuals who Desire Revolt versus Net Income 
(at 1985 US$ and exchange rates): 12 Nations, 1976-90.  
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Figure 2: The Proportion of Individuals who Desire Revolt versus Inequality 
(measured by the Gini Coefficient): 12 Nations, 1976-90. 
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Figure 3: The Proportion of Individuals who Desire Revolt versus Military Spending 
as a Proportion of GDP: 12 Nations from 1976-90. 
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Figure 4: The Proportion of Individuals who Desire Revolt versus the Inflation 
Rate: 12 Nations from 1976-90. 
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Table E:  Summary Statistics 
      
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
      
REVOLUTIONARY SUPPORT 119 0.060 0.018  0.019 0.127 
NET INCOME 119 9065 2588 3655 13801 
INCOME INEQUALITY 119 0.315 0.040  0.229 0.410 
MILITARY 119 0.047 0.022 0.016 0.112 
OIL 100 1.285 0.671 0.311 3.256 
RIGHT WING 100 5.504 1.633 2.275 7.800 
OPENNESS 100 0.775 0.350  0.411 1.677 
UNEMPLOYMENT 100 0.093 0.040 0.032 0.220 
INFLATION RATE 100 0.082 0.049 -0.007 0.212 
HAPPINESS 100 0.021 0.296 -0.070 1.189 
Note: In the subsequent regressions, NET INCOME has been scaled down by a factor of 1000 
for reporting purposes. 
 
 
 40
 
 
 
Table I 
What Determines the Support for Revolt? 
Panel of 12 Countries from 1976 to 1990 using 
Residuals from the 1st Stage Regression. 
 
Dependent Variable: 
REVOLUTIONARY 
SUPPORT 
 
 
(1) 
 
 
(2) 
 
I.V. 
(3) 
 
I.V. 
(4) 
 
     
NET INCOME -1.8e-4 
 (8.7e-4)
  -0.008*** 
(0.003) 
  -0.014*** 
(0.004) 
  -0.022** 
(0.010) 
     
INCOME 
INEQUALITY  
0.036 
(0.056) 
   0.375*** 
(0.109) 
   0.659*** 
(0.169) 
   0.855*** 
(0.262) 
     
MILITARY   -0.146** 
(0.063) 
  -0.572*** 
(0.130) 
   -0.619*** 
 (0.185) 
-1.603 
 (1.512) 
     
     
     
     
     
     
Personal Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Country Dummies 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Year Dummies 
 
No 
 
No 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
R2 0.04
 
0.33
 
0.34
 
0.30 
Observations 119
 
119
 
100
 
100
Notes: [1] * denotes significance at the 10% level. ** denotes significance at the 
5% level. *** denotes significance at the 1% level. [2] White-corrected Standard 
Errors in brackets. [3] I.V. refers to estimation using Instrumental Variables 
(Two Stage Least Squares). All the explanatory variables are treated as 
endogenous. [4] Regressions (3) and (4) have fewer observations due to limited 
instrument data availability. [5] NET INCOME has been scaled down by a 
factor of 1000 for reporting purposes. 
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Table II 
What Determines the Support for Revolt? Further Tests with Additional 
Explanatory Variables. Panel of 12 Countries from 1976 to 1990 using 
Residuals from the 1st Stage Regression. 
    
Dependent Variable: 
REVOLUTIONARY 
SUPPORT 
I.V. 
(5) 
I.V. 
(6) 
I.V. 
(7) 
    
REVOLUTIONARY 
SUPPORT  t-1 
 0.106 
 (0.141) 
  
    
NET INCOME -0.015* 
(0.008) 
 -0.026** 
(0.012) 
  -0.014*** 
(0.004) 
    
INCOME 
INEQUALITY  
  0.731** 
(0.344) 
   0.871*** 
(0.287) 
   0.697*** 
(0.202) 
    
MILITARY -0.480 
 (1.120) 
-2.349 
 (1.794) 
-0.277 
 (0.256) 
    
INFLATION RATE  -0.010 
 (0.112) 
  0.128** 
(0.066) 
    
UNEMPLOYMENT  -0.317 
 (0.283) 
0.013 
(0.082) 
    
    
    
    
    
Personal Controls Yes Yes Yes 
 
Country Dummies 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Year Dummies 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
R2 0.35
 
0.20
 
0.37 
Observations 92
 
100
 
100
Notes: [1] * denotes significance at the 10% level. ** denotes significance 
at the 5% level. *** denotes significance at the 1% level. [2] White-
corrected Standard Errors in brackets. [3] I.V. refers to estimation using 
Instrumental Variables (Two Stage Least Squares) where INCOME, 
INCOME INEQUALITY and MILITARY are all treated as endogenous 
variables. [4] NET INCOME has been scaled down by a factor of 1000 
for reporting purposes. 
 
 42
Appendix I 
 
The Euro-Barometer Survey Series [1975-1992] 
The Euro-Barometer Surveys used in this paper were conducted by various research 
firms operated within the European Community (E.C.) countries under the direction 
of the European Commission. Either a nationwide multi-stage probability sample or 
a nationwide stratified quota sample of persons aged 15 and over was selected in 
each of the E.C. countries. The cumulative data file used contains 36 attitudinal, 21 
demographic and 10 analysis variables selected from the European Communities 
Studies, 1970-1973, and Euro-Barometers, 3-38. 
Data for Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom were available for the full sample period 
which was used (1976-1990) whereas data were only available from 1981 to 1990 for 
Greece and from 1985 to 1990 for both Spain and Portugal. The number of 
observations in the sample was 18992 for Belgium, 19954 for Britain, 21221 for 
Denmark, 22298 for France, 21237 for West Germany, 15639 for Greece, 14936 for 
Ireland, 25066 for Italy, 6668 for Luxembourg, 21870 for The Netherlands, 7218 for 
Portugal and 6582 for Spain. 
 
The Combined World Values Survey [1980 and 1990] 
The Combined World Values Survey used in the paper was produced by the 
Institute for Social Research, Ann Arbor, MI. Both national random and quota 
sampling were used. All of the surveys were carried out through face-to-face 
interviews, with a sampling universe consisting of all adult citizens, aged 18 and 
older, across 45 societies around the world. In total, 379 attitudinal, demographic 
and analysis variables were collected.  
 Data for The United States, Canada, Mexico, Japan, Argentina, France, 
Britain, West Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium, Spain, Ireland, 
South Africa, Hungary, Norway, Sweden, Iceland and Finland were available for 
both 1980 and 1990. Data for China, Russia, Brazil, Slovenia, Portugal, Poland, 
Nigeria, Chile, India, Czech-Slovak, East Germany, Bulgaria, Austria, Lithuania, 
Latvia and Estonia were only available for 1990. Australia was only available for 
1980. The number of observations for which data were available for the purposes of 
the present paper was 3737 for The United States, 2703 for Canada, 2911 for 
Mexico, 1336 for Japan, 1792 for Argentina, 2057 for France, 2508 for Britain, 3019 
for West Germany, 3190 for Italy, 2021 for The Netherlands, 1965 for Denmark, 
3297 for Belgium, 5691 for Spain, 2054 for Ireland, 3754 for South Africa, 1153 for 
Australia, 887 for Hungary, 2324 for Norway, 1790 for Sweden, 1595 for Iceland, 
532 for Finland, 958 for China, 1703 for Russia, 1725 for Brazil, 769 for Slovenia, 
989 for Portugal, 855 for Poland, 946 for Nigeria, 1378 for Chile, 2321 for India, 
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1391 for Czech-Slovak, 1280 for East Germany, 928 for Bulgaria, 1288 for Austria, 
932 for Lithuania, 765 for Latvia and 890 for Estonia. 
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Appendix II 
The Microeconometric Determinants of the Desire for Revolution (Logit Regressions): 1976-90. 
 
Dep Var: Revolution Desired? 
 
U.K. 
 
    Italy 
 
Germany 
 
Belgium 
 
Unemployed 
 
0.373  
(0.122) 
 
0.287  
(0.106) 
 
-0.176  
 (0.211) 
 
0.247  
(0.108) 
 
Self employed 
 
0.150 
(0.124) 
 
0.164 
(0.075) 
 
0.063 
(0.173) 
 
0.110 
(0.110) 
 
Male 
 
0.115  
(0.071) 
 
0.403 
(0.059) 
 
0.278 
(0.096) 
 
0.430 
(0.071) 
 
Age  
 
-0.009  
 (0.012) 
 
-0.015  
 (0.011) 
 
-6.7e-4 
 (0.016) 
 
-0.038  
 (0.012) 
 
Age Squared 
 
-7.7e-5 
 (1.3e-4) 
 
-3.7e-5 
 (1.2e-4) 
 
 1.9e-5 
 (1.7e-4)  
 
 2.9e-4 
 (1.3e-4)  
 
Education to age: 15-18 years 
 
-0.279 
 (0.096) 
 
 0.043 
 (0.073) 
 
 -0.210 
  (0.105) 
 
-0.058 
 (0.079) 
 
                             ≥ 19 years 
 
-0.530 
 (0.133) 
 
 0.090 
 (0.073) 
 
 -0.143 
  (0.139) 
 
-0.291 
 (0.096) 
 
Marital Status: Married  
 
-0.243 
 (0.094) 
 
-0.204 
 (0.076) 
 
-0.416 
 (0.122) 
 
-0.041 
 (0.093) 
 
                        Divorced 
 
-0.016  
 (0.163) 
 
 0.794  
 (0.260) 
 
-0.044  
 (0.192) 
 
 0.467  
 (0.177) 
 
                        Separated 
 
0.184  
(0.216) 
 
0.696  
(0.193) 
 
-0.066  
 (0.400) 
 
0.373  
(0.185) 
 
                        Widowed 
 
-0.287  
 (0.155) 
 
-0.346  
 (0.152) 
 
-0.480  
 (0.194) 
 
 0.038  
 (0.164) 
 
No. of children ≥ 8 & 15 yrs:   1 
                  
 
0.127  
(0.089) 
 
-0.082  
 (0.067) 
 
-0.039  
 (0.133) 
 
 0.078  
 (0.081) 
 
                                                 2                  
 
0.238  
(0.100) 
 
-0.154  
 (0.100) 
 
 0.111  
 (0.168) 
 
 0.095  
 (0.112) 
 
                                                 3 
 
-0.135  
 (0.173) 
 
 0.224  
 (0.169) 
 
 0.324  
 (0.274) 
 
 0.241  
 (0.160) 
 
Income Quartiles:  Second  
 
-0.231  
 (0.092) 
 
-0.166  
 (0.071) 
 
-0.292  
 (0.111) 
 
-0.162  
 (0.087) 
 
                              Third 
 
-0.415  
 (0.098) 
 
-0.282  
 (0.075) 
 
-0.601  
 (0.122) 
 
-0.311  
 (0.092) 
 
                              Fourth (highest) 
 
-0.764  
 (0.109) 
 
-0.301  
 (0.079) 
 
-0.866  
 (0.133) 
 
-0.447  
 (0.101) 
 
Retired 
 
 
-0.040  
 (0.134) 
 
-0.107  
 (0.118) 
 
-0.634  
 (0.185) 
 
-0.393  
 (0.138) 
 
School 
 
0.275  
(0.174) 
 
0.113  
(0.104) 
 
0.060  
(0.168) 
 
0.054  
(0.135) 
 
At home 
 
0.022  
(0.095) 
 
-0.099  
 (0.095) 
 
 0.006  
 (0.135) 
 
 0.035  
 (0.105) 
 
Obs. 
 
19,954 
 
25,066 
 
21,237 
 
18,992 
Notes: All regressions include region and year dummies from 1976 to 1990. For the U.K., Italy, 
Germany and Spain, Log-likelihood=-4474, -6325, -2715 and -4574, respectively, and Chi2(46)= 
299, Chi2(38)=534, Chi2(44)=208 and Chi2(44)=343, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Appendix IV 
Data Definitions 
Countries: Belgium, Britain, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. The base category for the 
cumulative  regression in Table D is France. 
 
REVOLUTIONARY SUPPORT: The coefficients on the year dummies from an 
Ordinary Least Squares regression of whether or not a respondent answers that 
“The entire way our society is organised must be radically changed by revolutionary 
action”, controlling for    personal characteristics, for each country. 
 
NET INCOME: Average household current receipts per capita, after deducting 
direct taxes (=income taxes plus employee social security contributions), at 1985 
price levels and exchange rates (in U.S. dollars), from the CEP-OECD data set 
[1950-1992]. 
 
INCOME INEQUALITY: The Gini coefficient from the Deininger and Squire 
(1996) ‘high quality’ data set. Missing years were linearly interpolated, which includes 
1976-78 and 1980-83 for France; 1979-80 and 1982 for Germany; 1981-86 for 
Ireland; 1985, 1988 and 1990 for Italy; 1976, 1978, 1980 and 1984 for The 
Netherlands; 1980-84 and 1986-87  for Belgium; 1977-80, 1982-86 and 1988-90 for 
Denmark; 1985-87 for Greece; and 1985-89 for Portugal. No interpolated years were 
used for Britain, Luxembourg or Spain. 
 
MILITARY: Total military expenditures divided by GDP, from the Statistical 
Abstract of the United States and World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers. 
 
OIL: An index of the country-specific price of oil, calculated as the price of oil in the 
local currency, divided by each nation’s GDP deflator and standardized to equal 1 
across all nations in 1975. The oil price is taken from The Statistical Abstract of the 
United States (various issues). Exchange rate and GDP deflator data are from the 
CEP-OECD data set [1950-1992]. 
 
RIGHT WING: Index of left/right political party strength, defined as the sum of the 
number of votes received by each party participating in cabinet expressed as a 
percentage of total votes received by all parties with cabinet representation, 
multiplied by a left/right political scale constructed by political scientists. Votes are 
from Mackie and Rose’s (1982), The International Almanac of Electoral History, cabinet 
composition is from The Europa Yearbook (1969-1989 editions), and the left/right 
scale is from Castles and Mair (1984). 
 
OPENNESS: Imports plus exports, all divided by GDP, from CEP-OECD [1950-
1992]. 
 
UNEMPLOYMENT: The unemployment rate, from CEP-OECD data set [1950-
1992]. 
 
INFLATION RATE: Rate of change in the GDP deflator, from CEP-OECD 
[1950-1992]. 
